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1Major League Baseball Player Contracts:
An Investigation of the Empirical Properties of Real Options
I.  Introduction
This paper studies the contracts of Major League Baseball players to investigate the use of
real options in a commercial setting.  Real options arise when firms or agents have flexibility to
extend, modify, terminate or otherwise alter their contractual rights with respect to an asset.  The
rights associated with real options may be acquired explicitly through contract or implicitly as a
consequence of ownership.  Examples of real options in business include the right to drill for oil
on a parcel of land or to the right to produce a film from an author's screenplay.  Trigeorgis
(1996) provides an introduction to real options, including a comprehensive literature survey.
In Major League Baseball, players' contracts often include provisions allowing either the
player or, more commonly, the team to extend the contract for an additional season at a fixed
salary.  Baseball players' services appear well-suited to this type of option-based contracting due
to their potentially large future value and the highly uncertain evolution of this value over time. 
Because options in baseball contracts are explicitly bargained for by teams and players, and
because they exhibit cross-sectional diversity of such features as timing and exercise price, they
offer an unusual opportunity for empirically investigating the breadth, sophistication and efficiency
of real options in a business environment.
1 Any baseball fan can recite examples of teams lavishing exorbitant contracts upon mediocre players, and similar
cases of players refusing generous contracts from their teams because of delusions that they would receive more on the
open market.  At an industry-wide level, the turbulent bargaining history between players and owners has included more
than a half dozen shutdowns of Major League Baseball since 1972 for lockouts or strikes, including cancellation of the
1994 World Series.
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The baseball contracts that we study feature widespread use of real options, and these
options appear to be rationally valued through the adjustment of other payments over a contract's
life.  In our sample of 1,107 contracts signed by veteran players in the mid-1990s, option rights
are included about 18% of the time, with a disproportionate concentration in the contracts of
more highly-paid, talented players.  Team options, equivalent to call options on a player's future
services, are far more common than player options, which are put options on the same services. 
Some contracts are complex enough to include both team and player options, some have a series
of options that must be exercised sequentially, and still others include contingencies that require
the team to exercise its option if the player meets performance goals.  Regression analysis
indicates that the presence of these options has significant explanatory power for player
compensation.  As option pricing theory would predict, we find that players receive higher
guaranteed salaries when they allow the team to take options on their future services, and lower
salaries when they retain options to extend their own contracts.  The apparent value of team
option premiums decreases as a function of the "spread," or option exercise price compared to
annual salary, and increases as a function of the time until the option must be exercised.  This
relatively sophisticated use of contingent claims in baseball contracts may surprise readers, since
baseball players and teams share a long reputation for inept, destructive negotiating.1
To our knowledge, these results represent the first empirical study of a commercial market
in which agents routinely bargain over the terms of real options in order to complete contracts. 
3Many previous authors have identified uses of real options in business, but the empirical analysis
in these papers has generally been limited to hypothetical simulations of implicit option values or
analysis of the option component of an isolated, individual project.  Leading examples have
included leasing contracts (McConnell and Schallheim (1983)), natural resource extraction
(Brennan and Schwartz (1985); Morck, Schwartz, and Stangeland (1989); Davis (1996)), the
timing of capital investments (McDonald and Siegel (1986); Majd and Pindyck (1987)), and real
estate development (Capozza and Sick (1991)).  Related research has shown that prices of
ordinary financial assets incorporate the value of real options that exist implicitly due to regulation
or market structure.  For example, equity securities include options such as the limited liability
right to default on debt (Trigeorgis (1993)) and the right to sell a firm if liquidation value exceeds
the present value of expected cash flows (Berger, Ofek and Swary (1996)).
Two prior empirical papers have studied samples of business transactions in attempts to
detect real option values: Paddock, Siegel, and Smith (1988) and Quigg (1993).  Both of these
papers analyze real options that exist implicitly within property rights and have generally identical
terms, in contrast to our examination of real options whose diverse parameters emerge explicitly
as an outcome of direct bargaining between parties.  Paddock t al. analyze bids on 21 Gulf of
Mexico petroleum lease tracts auctioned by the U.S. government in 1980; winning bidders
acquired options to explore the tracts and further options to drill for oil if exploration proved
promising.  The authors find that an option-based model of each lease's value "correlates poorly"
with the average and winning bids actually submitted for the 21 lease parcels.  They speculate that
oil producers' strategic bidding behavior and anxiety to avoid a "winner's curse" may explain some
of the disparity.  Quigg (1993) studies 2,700 sales of undeveloped land in Seattle between 1976
4and 1979, examining whether transaction prices include an implicit option component related to
future opportunities to redevelop the land.  Quigg finds that sale prices do include an option
premium above the land's estimated intrinsic value; the estimated premium ranges from 1% to
30% with a mean of 6%.
The nature of our data allows us to examine a wider range of questions and probably
conduct statistical tests of greater power than Paddock et al. (1988) and Quigg (1993).  Since the
options we study in baseball contracts are created explicitly through bilateral negotiation, we
expect teams and players to account carefully for their value when bargaining over other contract
terms.  We also have an abundance of information about the characteristics of baseball players
whose services become subject to options, whereas the earlier studies necessarily treated oil rights
and undeveloped real estate parcels as basically homogenous.  Our data therefore enable us to
explore for the first time such empirical questions as whether real option values depend as
expected on exercise price, maturity, and unique characteristics of the underlying assets.
The paper is organized as follows.  Section II describes our data sources and key variable
definitions.  Section III contains our analysis.  Section IV presents a discussion and conclusions.
II.  Data Description
Obtaining accurate data about baseball players' contracts and salaries is challenging. 
Though newspapers run thousands of stories on this subject each year, information disclosed by
teams or player agents is notoriously unreliable; data are often exaggerated by one side or the
other in order to create fan interest in the team or influence ongoing negotiations with other
players.  In addition, tabulations of player salaries published in newspapers usually ignore
5important elements such as the time value of money in multi-year contracts or contingent future
payments.
Our source of player compensation data is the "Joint Exhibit 1," an official document
produced annually by Major League Baseball (the sport's governing authority) and the Major
League Baseball Players Association (the players' union) pursuant to their collective bargaining
agreement.  The Joint Exhibit 1 contains authoritative, comprehensive descriptions of contract
terms for all players active on August 31 of the prior season, supplemented by data such as each
player's length of service and whether contingent incentive bonuses under prior contracts were in
fact earned.  By terms of the collective bargaining agreement this document is confidential, and
we were rebuffed in attempts to obtain it from official sources.  However, we were fortunate to
be provided with the 1994, 1996, and 1997 editions of the Joint Exhibit 1 by Doug Pappas,
chairman of the Business of Baseball Committee of the Society for American Baseball Research,
an organization devoted to the study of on- and off-field aspects of the sport.  Our main sample of
player contracts is transcribed from this source; unfortunately, we did not have access to the 1995
document.  Contract terms are repeated in future annual editions of the Joint Exhibit 1 so long as
a player remains active on August 31 of the following season, so we did obtain data for most
contracts signed in 1994 (exceptions consisted mainly of players who signed contracts before the
1994 season and subsequently retired before August 1995).
We use individual player contracts as our unit of analysis.  Since many players have long-
term agreements that last for up to six years, not everyone signs a new contact each season. 
Importantly, we drop from our sample those players with less than three years experience at the
time of their contract signings, because baseball's bargaining framework creates severe restrictions
2 Inspection of the data indicates that players with less than three years experience receive vastly lower pay than
veterans, and that one-year contracts are almost universal among this group.  Rookies almost invariably earn the major
league minimum salary ($109,000 during most of our sample period) and can usually expect only modest increases until
they complete their third season, even if they become All Stars before then.
An interesting exception to this pattern occurred in the early 1990s when the Cleveland Indians signed a group of
talented first- and second-year players to lucrative long-term contracts as a strategy for reducing long-term payroll costs. 
The strategy was somewhat successful, as Cleveland reached the World Series twice in the mid-1990s, but the Indians
eventually traded or chose not to re-sign most of these players and other teams did not emulate their approach.  As of 1999,
Cleveland has not won the World Series in 51 years.
3 In arbitration, the player and team submit proposed one-year salaries.  A neutral arbitrator holds a hearing and
then must select one salary or the other, based on the compensation of other players with similar performance histories. 
The procedure facilitates compromises by forcing teams and players to make binding contract proposals; the vast majority
of cases settle during the interval between offer submission and the hearing, with players and teams often splitting the
difference between their proposals.  In unusual cases when a team proposes a salary higher than the player, the player
receives the team's offer.
A small quota of players who come close to having three years experience are also eligible for arbitration each
year, but we exclude this group because the exact service threshold and number of players eligible changes each season.
4 One observation is dropped from our regressions related to options, because our source did not report complete
data for the terms of the contract’s option year.
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on their compensation.  Players with less than three years service may negotiate contracts only
with their current teams and do not have the right to sell their services on the open market.2  Aft r
three years, players are still restricted to negotiating with only their own teams but gain the right
to salary arbitration, an established procedure in which expert third parties use league-wide data
to resolve salary disputes between veteran players and teams.3  After six years, players gain the
right to "free agency," under which they essentially may auction their services to the highest-
bidding teams (players with more than three years' service may also become free agents if their
teams do not agree to salary arbitration, but such cases are rare).  Tremendous mobility of players
among teams and spectacular bidding wars have characterized the market for veteran players
since arbitration and free agency were introduced in stages during the 1970s.
Limiting our analysis to players with three or more years of service, we obtain a sample of
1,107 contracts signed between 1989 and 1996.4  Of these, 752 are one-year contracts while the
5 Our data source covers each team's active roster of 25 players as of August 31 of the previous season, plus
injured players on the disabled list at that time, plus a fairly large number of inexperienced players who had signed major
league contracts at some point during the season when moving transiently between the major and minor leagues.  Major
League Baseball expanded from 26 to 28 teams in 1993 (and again to 30 teams in 1998, after our sample period), so that
approximately 800 to 900 players could be considered "major leaguers" at any time during our sample period.  Excluding
players with less than three years experience, our data cover approximately 500 veteran players active at any given time.
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remainder provide for between two and six guaranteed years, so that our sample covers a total of
1,790 guaranteed player-years.  The sample represents a nearly comprehensive cross-section of
contracts in effect for veteran players in the mid-1990s.5
Players receive compensation in several forms, including signing bonuses, base salaries,
incentive bonuses, and on occasion, payments related to the exercise or buyout of options at the
end of the contract.  Players also sign contracts of varying length.  To summarize these data into a
single statistic for annual pay, we begin by estimating the present value of expected compensation
over the life of a contract:
This approach assumes that the incentive bonuses earned in the first year of the contract -- data
that we have from the Joint Exhibit 1 document -- are earned in the same amount in each
succeeding contract year.  Simplifying incentive data in this way is necessary because of its
complexity and unforecastability; bonuses can cover everything from a player's weight to his
playing time to the team's home attendance.  This simplification is of minor importance, since
aggregate incentive bonuses equal less than 4% of  base salary payments.  This discount rates k1 . .
. kT represent our estimates of teams' weighted average costs of capital for different time periods. 
To estimate the WACC, we rely on balance sheet and stock trading data for the Cleveland
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Indians, the one major league team with publicly traded equity.  Our results are not sensitive to
the assumptions used in calculating the cost of capital; regression results are robust to such
simplifying assumptions as fixing the cost of capital at 12% or constraining â to equ l 1 in all cost
of equity calculations.  We assume that teams have time preferences for player performance
similar to their time preferences for money, so that expected performances in future years provide
utility that should also be discounted at the cost of capital.  This gives the following calculation
for annual compensation, based on dividing the total present value of the contract from (1) into
the contract's discounted number of years:
  Tables I and II provide descriptive statistics about our sample of contracts and options
included therein.  Table I indicates that more than half of all veteran players sign one-year
contracts, and the median annual salary lies slightly above $1 million.  About 18 percent of these
contracts, a total of 197 observations, include options to extend the contract after the final
guaranteed year T.  The incidence of options appears heavily concentrated among more highly-
paid players and those with multi-year contracts.  We find no discernable time trend in the
incidence of options.
Table II shows that the large majority of options, 179 out of 197, are "call" options held
by the team on the player's services; in 11 cases players have "put" options on their own services,
6 For example, Mark Grace's 1996 contract with the Chicago Cubs called for a $4,150,000 salary in 1996, a
player option for $4,600,000 for 1997, and a team option for 1998 at $5,250.000.  The 1998 team option could only be
exercised if the player first exercised his 1997 option.
7 For example, Larry Walker's 1995 contract with the Colorado Rockies included four guaranteed years and a
fifth option year that would vest and become guaranteed if he came to bat 475 times in the fourth year or 1,075 times in
third plus fourth years (a regular player will bat approximately 600 times in a season if he stays injury-free).  These
provisions occasionally create moral hazard problems, with teams holding players out of the lineup to prevent options from
vesting.  Baseball prohibits contract terms related to on-field statistics other than playing time, but occasionally options
include vesting provisions related to achievements such as a large number of votes in the Most Valuable Player balloting or
selection to the All Star team.
9
and an additional 7 contracts include both types of options.6 Most c tracts have just one option
year, though 22 have two one-year options and one contract has three one-year options; in
contracts with more than one option year, the later options become exercisable only when the
team or player exercises the prior option(s).  Baseball's rules allow teams and players to exercise
contract options at any time until several weeks following the end of the previous year's World
Series, but since it would not be rational for either the team or player to exercise an option early,
the options essentially resemble European calls and puts.
About one-fourth of all options include "vesting" provisions under which the team would
be required to exercise the option if an uncertain future event occurred.  The vesting
contingencies almost always involve playing time, requiring the player to appear in a certain
number of games or come to bat a certain number of times in the year(s) before the team's option
exercise decision.  Generally a player will meet these contingencies if he avoids injuries and holds
a regular starting position.7
Among our 179 contracts that include team options, 114 have "buyout" provisions that
require that team to pay a fixed sum to the player if it does not exercise the option (one contract
with a player option also includes a buyout provision).  Since a player is guaranteed to receive this
money whether or not the option is exercised, we modify the calculations for total compensation
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in (1) and (2) by adding buyout amounts to a contract's final year guaranteed salary and
subtracting these amounts from the option exercise price.
We merge our data on player contracts with data on player performance and personal
characteristics.  Unlike contract data, which is difficult to obtain, baseball performance statistics
are available from an enormous range of published and on-line sources (and are arguably more
accessible to the public than even data about the stock market).  Most of our performance and
player data was downloaded from authoritative databases maintained by STATS, Inc., a
commercial service that dominates the market for sports statistics.
III.  Analysis
To isolate the role of options in baseball player contracts, we build a regression model that
attempts to explain as much of a player's compensation as possible.  We then augment our
regressions by adding explanatory variables that indicate the presence of options and describe
their characteristics.  Our statistical tests examine whether a player's overall compensation is
adjusted in a rational way to reflect the presence and structure of these options.
A.  Benchmark Regression Model of Player Compensation
To begin our analysis, we fit a regression model that attempts to explain the level of a
player's compensation.  Our specification and functional form is similar to prior labor economics
research related to baseball such as Kahn (1983) and Burgess and Marburger (1993).  We
estimate an OLS regression with the dependent variable equal to the log of annual compensation,
as defined in (2) above:
8 Our indicator variables for position played are not defined as (0, 1) dummies.  Instead we divide games played
at each position by a player's total number of games played in the field, so that the sum of the position variables is 1.00 for
all players except designated hitters.
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We use an exhaustive range of explanatory variables, including a player's age and years of
major league service; indicator variables for the year of contract signing, the team signed with,
and the position played by the player;8 a minority race dummy variable that equals 1 if the player is
not a U.S.-born Caucasian; and indicator variables for players who had no performance data in
one of the three years prior to contract signing, which could occur because of serious injuries,
temporary retirements, or, in a handful of cases, players temporarily moving to the Japanese
league.  We include an indicator for players who change teams when they sign new contracts,
since Lehn (1990) presents evidence that prior team’s decision not to retain the player may
represent an adverse selection problem related to its information about the player’s skill,
motivation, or health.  Most importantly, we include a wide range of on-field batting, pitching and
fielding performance statistics for the year preceding the contract signing and also for the prior
two years.  Batting variables include at bats, runs, hits, doubles, triples, home runs, runs batted in,
bases on balls, stolen bases, times caught stealing, and times grounded into double plays, as well
as their squares and two years of lagged data for both linear and squared terms.  For pitchers,
performance variables include games, games started, complete games, games finished, wins,
losses, saves, hits allowed, earned runs allowed, bases on balls, and strikeouts.   Since batting
statistics do not apply to pitchers and pitching statistics do not exist for batters, we incorporate
them into the regression model using an indicator variable, P1, which equals 1 for pitchers and 0
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for position players:
Fielding statistics are difficult to interpret in baseball and are not clearly comparable across
positions.  We therefore identify players with strong fielding ability by including an indicator
variable if a player wins a Gold Glove award for being voted the outstanding fielder at his position
in the year prior to contract signing; we also include a player's cumulative total of Gold Gloves
won and its square.  Our performance variables are extremely collinear, and we are not concerned
with their individual coefficient estimates or standard errors since our goal instead is to construct
a regression model that explains a substantial part of the variation in player compensation.  
Given the structure of our later tests for impact of options upon contract values, it will be
convenient for us to exponentiate both sides of (3) and estimate regressions of the form:
We estimate our regressions using TSP's nonlinear least squares LSQ procedure; the resulting
estimates are equivalent to maximum likelihood estimates under the assumption that the µi
disturbances follow a normal distribution.
The benchmark regression model (5) appears quite successful as a tool for predicting
player compensation.  We achieve high R2 goodness-of-fit statistics of approximately 0.80 to
0.85, depending on the exact specification used.  Table III provides detail about the variation in
player compensation explained by various regressors alone and in combination.  The table shows
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R2 statistics for regressions of annual compensation, as defined in (2) above, against an intercept
and different sets of regressors.  On-field performance seems overwhelmingly important in
determining player compensation, as the prior year's batting or pitching statistics alone can
account for more than two-thirds of the variation in a player's annual pay and the prior three years'
statistics account for more than three-fourths.  Defensive ability appears important, though less so
than batting or pitching prowess, as data about prior Gold Glove awards explains about 10
percent of the variation in pay and dummy variables for position played explain about 5 percent. 
The year of contract signing and the identity of the team signed with also have significant
explanatory power for player compensation when studied in the absence of other factors, but their
incremental importance appears small since their inclusion along with the model's other data
improves R2 only from 0.82 to 0.84.  A player's race, age, and years of service appear to have
only a minor role in determining pay variation; these findings are interesting because they imply
that discrimination and seniority, two factors that are very important in much labor economics
research, do not play large roles in the market for established baseball players.
Table IV provides a list of explanatory variables used in our benchmark model, coefficient
estimates for certain variables, and summary statistics about the regression.  Several of our
coefficient estimates are interesting because of prior academic research or widely held public
beliefs about the market for baseball players.  We find that players' fixed compensation increases
with experience, as indicated by the positive coefficient on the linear term, but that this increase
occurs as a decreasing rate, as indicated by the negative coefficient on the quadratic term.  This
mirrors the results of Blass's (1992) study of human capital accumulation by baseball players. 
Players who sign with new teams receive compensation about 7.6 percent lower than expected, in
9  Florida drastically reversed this policy in 1998, after the cutoff date for our study.
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line with Lehn’s (1990) conjectures about information asymmetries creating a “lemons” problem
in the baseball labor market.  We find that non-white and non-U.S. players earn about 5.6 percent
less fixed pay than their white, U.S. counterparts; Hill and Spellman (1984) provide a survey of
prior studies that have reached divergent conclusions on whether discrimination impacts the
market for baseball players.  Dummy variable coefficients for individual years (not tabulated to
save space) indicate an upward trend in guaranteed player compensation through 1994 before a
sharp drop in 1995; this pattern can be readily attributed to the financially ruinous players strike
that occurred in August 1994 and was not settled until the intervention of the U.S. federal courts
the following April.  Catchers, shortstops, and center fielders earn higher fixed pay than other
position players, according to our position indicator variables; these results make sense since
those three positions are the most important in a team's defense.  Dummy variable estimates for
teams (also not tabulated) generally reflect beliefs widely held among baseball fans about different
clubs' bargaining practices; the Montreal Expos and Milwaukee Brewers, two teams known to be
tightfisted, are among those paying the lowest compensation after controlling for all other
variables, while the famously profligate New York Yankees, Los Angeles Dodgers, and Florida
Marlins are among those teams paying the highest.9  However, some surprises emerge among the
team dummy variable estimates.  For instance, Pittsburgh, a team with a notoriously small payroll,
is estimated to lie among those teams with the highest salary structures after controlling for
performance, seniority, and other factors; this suggests that Pittsburgh's low aggregate payroll
results not from penurious negotiating, but rather from a tendency to fill its roster with lower-
skilled, less experienced players who are nevertheless overpaid relative to their market values.
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B.  Valuation of Team and Player Options
When players take long or short positions in options on their own services as part of the
bargaining process with their teams, the contract should include a value transfer that reflects the
option's worth.  Our empirical strategy to detect this value transfer relies on our benchmark
regression model of player compensation, with the dependent variable measuring annual pay.  
To test for the presence of the option premium, we estimate two models.  First, we
assume that the option premium represents a percentage markup over a player's expected
compensation.  We estimate the regression:
where ã represents the option premium.  Alternatively, we assume that the option premium
represents a dollar value markup over expected compensation:
Since the dependent variable yi represents average compensation over the life of a contract that
can run between one and six years, we must adjust the option premium by allocating it over the
length of the contract.  We therefore write the option premium as:
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where Ti is the contract length and k1 . . . kTi are discount rates defined as above; this adjustment
spreads the option premium over the life of the contract in the same way that other compensation
is handled in equation (2) above.  We substitute this term into (6) and (7), estimate those
regressions, and test for the significance of the ä coe fici nt estimates.  If a contract includes two
or more sequential options, (6) and (7) are extended in a straightforward way; for example, with
two options, the models are:
The most important hypothesis for us to test is that contract valuations adjust upward
when players allow teams to have an option on their future services, and downward when teams
grant players an option of the opposite form.  We estimate the above models with ø, the ption
premium, equal to the sum of two indicator variables, one for the presence of a team option and
one for the presence of a player option.  Table V presents the results.
Our coefficient estimates closely match the predictions of option pricing theory.  Players
17
are paid a positive option premium of about 11 percent of fixed compensation when the team
retains the right to extend the contract at a fixed salary; estimates in the table imply that the
premium is just under $200,000 for each year under option.  In the symmetric case in which the
player retains the right to extend the contract, he receives approximately 12 percent less
guaranteed pay, on the order of $140,000 per year for each option year he is granted (the dollar
value estimate is not statistically significant).  The dollar amounts of these option premia are
significant though not staggering in relation to player compensation; the average first-year salary
of the contracts including these options is $2.63 million for contracts with player options and
$1.99 million for contracts that include team options.
C.  Further Analysis of Team Options
Estimates in Table V indicate that the value of players' contracts includes a positive
premium when teams receive a call option on the player's services, and a negative premium when
the player receives a put option.  In this section, we study the behavior of team option premia as a
function of parameters upon which option value should depend: exercise price, option life, and
volatility of player skills.  We only analyze team options because of the rarity of player options,
which appear in only 18 of our 1,107 contracts, or less than 2 percent, compared to an incidence
of 186 team options, or 16 percent.
i.  Exercise price
The value of the team option premium should have a negative relation to the option's
"spread," or how the exercise price compares to the intrinsic value of the underlying asset.  
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For estimation purposes, we measure the spread as the difference between the present
value of the option's exercise price and the average per year of the present value of the contract's
fixed salaries plus any signing bonus:
Table VI presents results for both of our option valuation models reestimated with the
spread variable included; the variable equals zero if no team option is present.  Estimates for the
spread variable appear in the second row of the table.  As expected, we continue to estimate
positive premia for team options, with the option premium decreasing as the spread increases. 
One of our two estimated coefficients for the spread variable is not statistically significant,
however.
ii.  Option life
A long-lived option is more valuable to its holder than an option with a short life, since
more time increases the probability that the underlying asset's intrinsic value will rise.  We
therefore expect option premia paid by teams to increase as a function of the time until the
option's exercise date.  Regression estimates exploring the importance of option life also appear in
Table VI, which includes our two option valuation models from above augmented by a variable
measuring the number of years before the option must be exercised (the variable equals zero if no
team option is present).
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As with the prior results for an option's spread, we obtain results for time until exercise
that are consistent with option pricing theory.  Team option premia appear to increase
significantly for each additional year until the option exercise date.  Although we estimate a
negative value for the team option premium in the first row of the table, every option has an
exercise date that is at least one year away, so the joint effect of the estimates generally implies
zero or positive option premium paid by the team to the player.
iii.  Volatility
Theory suggests that an option's value increases with the volatility of the underlying asset,
in this case, the services of a baseball player.  However, unlike the option's spread and time until
exercise, volatility cannot be directly measured.  We test for its influence on option premia by
using four different proxies for volatility: (i) an indicator variable for whether the player is a
pitcher, as pitchers’ performances are notoriously more volatile over time compared to those of
other players;  (ii) a player's age;  (iii) an indicator variable that equals 1 if the player did not
appear in any games in the season prior to contract signing, which could occur due to serious
injury, temporary retirement, or playing in Japan; and  (iv) the difference between the highest and
lowest expected salaries for the player over the three years prior to contract signing.  We estimate
this final term based on fitted values from a regression of player compensation against on-field
performance variables only (deliberately focusing on player performance and excluding the effects
of such variables as year and team signed with).  
We take the interaction between the team option indicator and each of these four proxies
for volatility, adding each interaction term separately to the two option valuation models from
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Table V.  Results, which appear in Table VII, are inconclusive.  We do not estimate a statistically
significant coefficient for any of the eight interaction terms.  Five of the estimates are positive as
expected, but three are negative.  We are unable to tell whether these outcomes occur because
contracts do not take any account of the volatility of players' skills, or because our four proxies
for volatility are susceptible to large measurement error.
D.  Options with Exercise Contingencies
Of those contracts with options, about 27 percent contain "vesting" provisions that require
the team to exercise the option if the player meets certain performance criteria, generally related
to playing time.  A further 12 percent of the contracts include sequences of two or three
successive options; if the first option is not exercised, the remaining options become void.  
Vestable options and the latter options in a sequence should each have less economic
value than options without similar conditions.  We test these hypotheses by multiplying our ã
option premium terms by indicator variables for vestable options and for those options in the
latter part of a sequence.  Regression estimates for these variables are not significant in any of our
models.  When we estimate option premiums on a percentage basis, vestable options are estimated
to have value 31 percent lower than other options (t-statistic = 0.47), while sequential options
have value 6 percent higher than usual (t-statistic = 0.05).  For option premiums estimated on a
dollar value basis, both estimates are markedly positive instead of negative.
We do not have a clear explanation for this pattern of results, but we conjecture that the
incidence of vestable and sequential options may be correlated with omitted variables that would
also imply higher compensation for the player.  Players with vestable options tend to be among
10 These subgroups include such well-known players as Cal Ripken Jr., David Cone, Jeff Bagwell
 and Jose Canseco.
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the higher-paid in our sample; the mean first-year salary of their contracts is $2.28 million,
compared to $1.91 million for contracts with options that are non-vestable and $1.40 million for
contracts with no options; players signing contracts with sequential options receive mean first-
year salaries of $2.56 million.  It is possible that these subgroups of players have "star quality" fan
appeal beyond that implied by their statistics and as a result teams pay them higher salaries.10
IV.  Discussion and Conclusions
We study the role of options in the contracts of Major League Baseball players.  To our
knowledge, our results represent the first empirical study of a commercial market in which agents
routinely bargain over the terms of real options in order to complete contracts.
In our sample of 1,107 contracts signed by veteran players in the mid-1990s, option rights
are included about 18 percent of the time, with a disproportionate concentration in the contracts
of more highly-paid, talented players.  Team options, equivalent to call options on a player's
services, are far more prevalent than put options held by players on their own services.
We find that the presence of options has significant explanatory power for patterns of
player compensation.  As option pricing theory would predict, players receive higher guaranteed
compensation when they allow the team to take options on their future services, and lower
compensation when they receive options to extend their own contracts.  The apparent value of
team option premiums decreases as a function of the "spread," or option exercise price compared
to annual salary, and increases as a function of the time until the option must be exercised. 
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However, we find no significant results related to other important variables, including estimates of
the volatility of player ability and the presence of contingencies that might make future exercise of
an option either mandatory or impossible.
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Table I
Descriptive Statistics for Major League Baseball Player Contracts
Descriptive statistics for 1,107 Major League Baseball player contracts in effect during the mid-
1990s.  Contract descriptions were obtained from the 1994, 1996, and 1997 versions of the
confidential Joint Exhibit 1 document prepared by Major League Baseball for use in salary
arbitration hearings.  The sample includes all contracts reported in these documents, with the
exception of those signed by players with less than three years experience.  Mean annual salary
is calculated as the sum of guaranteed salary payments plus any signing bonus, divided by the
number of years in the contract.
Guaranteed
Contract Length
Number of
Observations
Contracts
With Options
Option
Frequency
1 year 752 81 11%
2 years 153 48 31%
3 years 111 42 38%
4 years 57 18 32%
5 years 33 8 24%
6 years 1 0 0%
Total 1,107 197 18%
Mean
Annual  Salary
Number of
Observations
Contracts
With Options
Option
Frequency
Below $0.5 million 259 17 7%
$0.5 to $1.0 million 267 30 11%
$1.0 to $2.5 million 258 63 24%
$2.5 to $5.0 million 283 73 26%
Above $5.0 million 40 14 35%
Total 1,107 197 18%
24
Table II
Features of Options in Major League Baseball Player Contracts
Descriptions of options included in 197 Major League Baseball player contracts in effect during
the mid-1990s.  Contract descriptions were obtained from the 1994, 1996, and 1997 versions
of the confidential Joint Exhibit 1 document prepared by Major League Baseball for use in
salary arbitration hearings.  The full sample of 1,107 includes all contracts reported in these
documents with the exception of those signed by players with less than three years experience.
Holder of Option Number of Contracts
Team 179
Player 11
Both Team and Player 7
Number of Option Years Number of Contracts
1 174
2 22
3 1
Features of Options Number of Contracts Frequency
Contingent vesting of option
based upon playing time
54 27%
Buyout payment required
if option not exercised
115 58%
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Table III
Goodness-of-Fit of Benchmark Model of Player Compensation
R2 goodness-of-fit statistics for non-linear least squares regressions with different specifications
of the explanatory variables.  The dependent variable in each regression equals the log of annual
compensation received by Major League Baseball players.  All regressions include an intercept
term in addition to those variables listed on each line.  The sample includes 1,107 contracts
signed by players with at least three years experience.  All variables are measured with respect
to the first year of the contract.  The minority indicator variable equals 1 if the player is not
U.S. born and Caucasian.  The indicators for inactive years equal 1 if the player did not play in
one of the three seasons prior to contract signing.  Batting variables include at bats, runs, hits,
doubles, triples, home runs, runs batted in, bases on balls, stolen bases, times caught stealing,
and times grounded into double plays, as well as their squares.  Pitching variables include
games, games started, complete games, games finished, wins, losses, saves, hits allowed, earned
runs allowed, bases on balls, and strikeouts.   Fielding variables include an indicator for winning
a Gold Glove award in the prior year, the cumulative total of Gold Gloves won prior to the
contract signing, and the square of cumulative Gold Gloves.
Variables
R2 with these
variables alone
R2 with this
group of variables
Age of player 0.0317
Years of service, service2 0.0146
Minority indicator variable 0.0024
Inactive years indicator variables 0.0366
Position indicator variables 0.0543
Batting and pitching variables (prior year only) 0.6889
Batting and pitching variables (prior two years)0.7603
Batting and pitching variables (prior three years)0.7788
Fielding variables 0.1028
        Sub-total: all player characteristics 0.8190
Year of contract signing indicator variables 0.0767
Team indicator variables 0.0307
        Total: all variables 0.8421
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Table IV
Coefficient Estimates for Benchmark Model of Player Compensation
Coefficient estimates for an non-linear least squares regression with the dependent variable
equal to the log of annual compensation received by Major League Baseball players, in $000. 
The sample includes 1,107 contracts signed by players with at least three years experience.  All
variables are measured with respect to the first year of the contract.  The minority indicator
variable equals 1 if the player is not U.S. born and Caucasian.  The model also includes an
intercept term and all of the additional variables listed.  T-statistics appear in parentheses
beneath each coefficient estimate.
Variable Estimate
Age of player -0.035
(4.75)
***
Years of service 0.150
(9.09)
***
Years of service2 -0.007
(8.66)
***
Minority indicator -0.056
(2.01)
**
Signed with new team indicator -0.076
(2.95)
***
Batting performance variables 11 variables in linear and squared form, for prior year
and also two years' lags.  Separate variables for
pitchers and position players. (total of 132).
Fielding performance variables Indicator for Gold Glove in prior year; variables for
cumulative Gold Gloves won and its square
Position played 9 variables measuring percentage of games played at
each position
Year of contract signing 7 indicator variables for 1990 through 1996
Team signed with 27 indicator variables
Did not play (indicator variables) 3 variables for players who did not play in prior year,
two years ago, or three years ago
R2
Adjusted R2
0.8421
0.8101
Significant at 1% (***) and 5% (**) levels.
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Table V
Valuation of Team and Player Options
Coefficient estimates for nonlinear least squares regressions with the dependent variable equal to
annual compensation received by Major League Baseball players, in $000.  The sample includes
1,106 contracts signed by players with at least three years experience.  The explanatory variables
shown are indicator variables for whether a contract may be extended at the option of the team or the
player.  Other explanatory variables, described more fully in Table IV, include age, years of service, a
minority race indicator variable, indicators for position played, team signed with, and year, and a
wide range of batting, pitching, and fielding performance statistics.  T-statistics appear in parentheses
beneath each coefficient estimate.
Model I:
Percentage Option Premium
Model II:
Dollar Value Option Premium
Variable Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
Team
option
indicator
0.103
(2.14)
** 0.114
(2.36)
** 195.3
(2.52)
** 199.0
(2.56)
**
Player
option
indicator
-0.106
(1.74)
* -0.124
(2.05)
** -110.9
(0.55)
-143.9
(0.71)
R2
Adj. R2
0.8429
0.8108
0.8425
0.8105
0.8435
0.8114
0.8431
0.8111
0.8421
0.8100
0.8432
0.8111
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
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Table VI
Team Option Values as Function of Spread and Time Until Exercise
Coefficient estimates for nonlinear least squares regressions with the dependent variable
equal to annual compensation received by Major League Baseball players, in $000.  The
sample includes 1,106 contracts signed by players with at least three years experience.  The
explanatory variables shown are an indicator variable for whether a contract may be
extended at the option of the team, along with expressions for the option "spread" and time
until exercise (these latter two variables equal zero if no option is present).  Other
explanatory variables, described more fully in Table IV, include age, years of service, a
minority race indicator variable, indicators for position played, team signed with, and year,
and a wide range of batting, pitching, and fielding performance statistics.  T-statistics
appear in parentheses beneath each coefficient estimate.
Model I:
Percentage Option Premium
Model II:
Dollar Value Option Premium
Variable Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
Team option
indicator
0.086
(1.77)
* -0.31
(0.55)
185.5
(2.39)
** -125.9
(1.37)
Option "spread" -0.00007
(1.35)
-0.260
(2.11)
**
Years until option
must be exercised
0.031
(3.79)
*** 145.5
(6.28)
***
R2
Adj. R2
0.8432
0.8110
0.8453
0.8136
0.8439
0.8119
0.8493
0.8184
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
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Table VII
Team Option Values as a Function of Volatility Proxies
Coefficient estimates for nonlinear least squares regressions with the dependent variable equal
to annual compensation received by Major League Baseball players, in $000.  The sample
includes 1,106 contracts signed by players with at least three years experience.  The
explanatory variables shown are an indicator variable for whether a contract may be extended
at the option of the team, along with interaction terms between this indicator and four separate
proxies for the volatility of the player's ability.  These proxies are (i) an indicator that equals 1 if
the player is a pitcher, (ii) the player's age, (iii) an indicator that equals 1 if the player did not
play during the year prior to contract signing, and (iv) the difference between the player's
highest and lowest expected salaries in the three years prior to contract signing, measured as
the fitted value of a regression of player compensation against on-field performance variables. 
Other explanatory variables are described more fully in Table IV.  T-statistics appear in
parentheses beneath each coefficient estimate.
Model I: Percentage Option Premium
Variable Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
Team option indicator 0.051
(0.81)
0.407
(1.00)
0.102
(2.09)
** 0.093
(1.58)
Team option indicator x
indicator for pitchers
0.108
(1.18)
Team option indicator x
player's age
-0.009
(0.76)
Team option indicator x
indicator for not playing prior year
0.048
(0.13)
Team option indicator x
difference between high and low
expected salaries over prior 3 years
0.001
(0.28)
R2
Adj. R2
0.8431
0.8109
0.8430
0.8108
0.8429
0.8106
0.8429
0.8107
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
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Table VII continued
Model II: Dollar Value Option Premium
Variable Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
Team option indicator 151.6
(1.34)
-772.2
(1.13)
201.9
(2.55)
** 235.7
(2.42)
**
Team option indicator x
indicator for pitchers
79.6
(0.52)
Team option indicator x
player's age
29.8
(1.43)
Team option indicator x
indicator for not playing prior year
-199.6
(0.42)
Team option indicator x
difference between high and low
expected salaries over prior 3 years
-4.1
(0.67)
R2
Adj. R2
0.8432
0.8110
0.8434
0.8113
0.8432
0.8110
0.8432
0.8111
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
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